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One strategy for winning a coevolutionary struggle is to evolve rapidly. Most of the literature
on host-pathogen coevolution focuses on this phenomenon, and looks for consequent evidence of
coevolutionary arms races. An alternative strategy, less often considered in the literature, is to
deter rapid evolutionary change by the opponent. To study how this can be done, we construct
an evolutionary game between a controller that must process information, and an adversary that
can tamper with this information processing. In this game, a species can foil its antagonist by
processing information in a way that is hard for the antagonist to manipulate. We show that the
structure of the information processing system induces a fitness landscape on which the adversary
population evolves, and that complex processing logic is required to make that landscape rugged.
Drawing on the rich literature concerning rates of evolution on rugged landscapes, we show how
a species can slow adaptive evolution in the adversary population. We suggest that this type of
defensive complexity on the part of the vertebrate adaptive immune system may be an important
element of coevolutionary dynamics between pathogens and their vertebrate hosts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coevolution is often antagonistic, such that one species
benefits from the other’s loss. Classic examples include
predators and their prey, and pathogens and their hosts.
Antagonistic coevolution is commonly thought to result
in rapid co-evolutionary arms races (1). When partic-
ipants in a coevolutionary arms race can tamper with
their opponents’ control systems, as microbial pathogens
do with host immune regulation (2, 3), we might expect
to see a series of subversion efforts and subsequent coun-
termeasures deployed over evolutionary time. Thus one
might expect rapid evolutionary divergence in the sys-
tems involved in controlling and regulating the attacks
and defenses used in antagonistic interactions (4).
However, antagonistic coevolution need not always
lead to rapid evolutionary change. Mechanisms that pre-
vent subversion can halt coevolutionary arms races; the
field of cryptography abounds with examples of such sys-
tems. In a prescient 1955 letter only recently declassified,
John Nash anticipated this result (5):
...for almost all sufficiently complex types
of enciphering, especially where the instruc-
tions given by different portions of the key in-
teract complexly with each other in the deter-
mination of their ultimate effects on the en-
ciphering, the mean key computation length
increases exponentially with the length of the
key....As ciphers become more sophisticated
the game of cipher breaking by skilled teams,
etc., should become a thing of the past.
Nash was right; one important example is the RSA
cryptosystem (6), in which two parties’ communication
over a network cannot be decoded by adversaries, unless
they successfully find the prime factors of a large number.
Prime factorization has been proven to be computation-
ally difficult (or in the parlance of computer science, has
high time complexity) and so the system is effectively
secure. The main insight for RSA was that a mecha-
nism can be made secure against subversion by using in-
tractability or complexity as a defense. In this paper we
explore how defensive complexity strategies can be gener-
alized to domains beyond cryptography — for example,
immunology.
To explore the role of defensive complexity in an-
tagonistic coevolution, we introduce a new evolutionary
game, the control network game. This game features two
players, the controller and the adversary. The controller
aims to respond appropriately to the state of the environ-
ment. To do this, the controller deploys a control system
intermediating between sensors that receive a cue about
the state of the world, and effectors that take an action.
This control system is codified as a control logic with the
cue as input and the effector responses as outputs. The
controller’s payoff is a function of the world state and
the actions taken. The adversary aims to interfere, and
can do so by tampering with some of the signals in the
control logic.
We study what happens when this game is played in
an evolutionary context. We pay particular attention to
the case in which the controller must first deploy a con-
trol logic, and the adversary then has multiple periods
in which to learn how to manipulate it. Such a state of
affairs could come about for many reasons. One common
biological scenario is when learning occurs at the popula-
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2tion level by the mechanism of evolution by natural selec-
tion and evolutionary rates differ, as is the case in a verte-
brate host deploying an immune control system against
rapidly evolving pathogen adversaries (7, 8). This sce-
nario provides us a well defined and formally tractable
learning system to study, in which an asexual adversary
population evolves on a fitness landscape and the relevant
phenotype space corresponds the set of possible manipu-
lations to the control system. Questions of which control
systems are hard to learn reduce to questions about the
rate of evolution given the fitness landscape induced for
the adversary by the control system. We can then use
population genetic analysis to characterize rates of evo-
lution for typical classes of fitness functions. We show
that complex control networks can generate sign epista-
sis in this fitness landscape, thereby carving fitness val-
leys that must be crossed and reducing the rate at which
an antagonist population evolves to subvert the network.
Thus control systems afford defensive complexity against
natural adversaries if they induce fitness functions for at-
tempted manipulation that take the form of rugged adap-
tive landscapes with long deep fitness valleys. Where
sufficient defensive complexity is in place, antagonistic
co-evolution can lead to long periods of structural stasis
instead of rapid change driven by an ongoing arms race.
II. DEFENSIVE COMPLEXITY OF SIGNALING
NETWORKS
To exploit a signaling system, an adversary must (1)
construct or disrupt signals used in the system, and (2)
do so in a way that increases its own fitness. In host-
pathogen interactions, step 1 is often simple. For exam-
ple, viruses readily perturb the cytokine signaling net-
work used by the host, by altering gene expression or
by producing cytokine mimics and antagonists (9, 10).
The latter problem—manipulating the signals in advan-
tageous ways—may be much harder. This is the chal-
lenge we focus on here. To do so, we make the univer-
sal construction assumption: the adversary can construct
any signal, but does not know what the signals do. Mak-
ing the universal construction assumption allows us to
reformulate the problem of evolving to manipulate the
host’s control network as a learning problem. Defensive
complexity then reduces to non-learnability of the control
system by the adversary population.
A. Control Network Games
We consider the two-player game between controller
and adversary illustrated in figure 1A. In each instance
of the game, a cue contains information about the state
of the environment. The controller aims to transduce
this cue into an appropriate response. To do so, the con-
troller’s sensory apparatus detects the cue, and produces
internal signals that will trigger the controller’s response.
The response is determined by a control logic tuned to
accomplish some task T . This control logic is selected
from the set L(T ) of minimal-cost control logics for this
task, i.e., from a set of control logics that all perform
optimally on the task T . The adversary aims to alter
the controller’s response and does so by perturbing the
controller’s internal signals.
We explore a game in which the control logic operates
on two signals S1 and S2. We model the control logic
as a simple branching logic on the signals as described
in the Methods. A fitness landscape is induced by the
example control network as follows: the adversaries at-
tempt tamper by up- or down-regulating the signals S1
or S2. Up-regulation or down-regulation of the signals
cause changes to the response value RA. For modeling
purposes we only need to describe the control logic and
its fitness consequences on the adversary as a function
of perturbations to the signals. We can do so in a way
that is equivalent to using a particular family of control
logics: in the Methods we show the correspondence be-
tween control logics from this family and control logics
with inputs described in terms of perturbations to the
signals.
We outline two simple examples of control logics and
the fitness landscapes that they induce. Let the fitness
of the adversary be 1 when there is no perturbation to
the control logic. First consider a simple signaling net-
work that has the control logic Ls and induces a fitness
landscape for the adversary as given by Figure 1b. This
fitness landscape is a slope, with each step toward down-
regulating S1 and up-regulating S2 being progressively
more beneficial for the adversary. Second, contrast this
with a control logic Lc that is more complex in that it
requires more logical operations per conditional IF in-
struction. The control logic Lc generates a multi-peaked
fitness landscape as shown in Figure 1c. On this land-
scape, any perturbation of a single signal away from the
starting state will decrease the adversary’s fitness.
B. Rate of learning
In the case of the simple control logic Ls, an evolving
adversary population can readily traverse the monotonic
fitness landscape shown in Figure 1b. Even when muta-
tion supply is limiting, an adversary population can reach
its fitness optimum by fixing two beneficial mutations in
succession. This is a relatively fast process, since drift or
mutation-selection balance is not necessary to maintain
the single mutation upon which the double mutant can
arise. We can estimate the timescale on which double
fixation occurs. Sequential fixation of two beneficial mu-
tations takes approximately τs = 1/
√
µ2N generations
on average (11), where N is the population size and µ is
the mutation rate for each mutation.
The complex fitness landscape induced by Lc and
shown in Figure 1c has five peaks. One of these (∆S1
down, ∆S2 up) is a global maximum; the others, includ-
ing the no-perturbation starting point, are local max-
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FIG. 1 Control network game. A. The controller and adversary play the following game: the controller deploys a control
logic and the adversary tries to subvert it. The controller has a sensor that transduces the cue into signals S1 and S2. The
control logic then processes these signals to determine the response. The payoff to the controller is maximized when the signals
are unperturbed, whereas the fitness of the adversary is some arbitrary function of the responses. Note that this game is
thus generically non-zero-sum. The adversary cannot control either the cue or the response directly, but can manipulate the
response by tampering with the signals S1 and S2. In our game, the adversary can upregulate, downregulate, or leave each
signal unchanged. B. A simple control logic induces a single-peaked fitness landscape on which the adversary can easily evolve to
the global optimum. C. A more complex control logic can induce a multi-peaked fitness landscape that prevents the adversary
from rapidly evolving to the global optimum.
ima. Between these peaks are fitness valleys that the
adversary population must cross. Suppose that the dele-
terious intermediate in the fitness valley suffers a fitness
disadvantage of δ relative to the no-perturbation state.
Following Weissman et al. (12), when the population size
of the adversary is less than N = 1δ log
δ2
µs and the selec-
tive disadvantage greater than 2
√
µs, the fitness valley
will tend to be crossed by a process known as stochastic
sequential fixation. In this process, the deleterious inter-
mediate initially drifts to fixation against selection, and
subsequently the beneficial double mutant arises and is
fixed by selection. In that regime, the expected number
of generations to cross the fitness valley is approximately
of order τc = µ
−1 e(N−1)δ. When population size of the
adversary is larger than 2spiµ2 and selective disadvantage
is lower than s, the system lies in the so-called determin-
istic regime. In this case, the population is large enough
that a double mutants are created immediately and these
go to fixation. In the deterministic regime the expected
number of generations to cross the fitness valley is ap-
proximately τc′ = log
(
s+δ
Nµ2
)
.
On the simple landscape induced by Ls, the time to
fixation τs is of order 1/
√
N . On the complex landscape
in the stochastic sequential fixation regime, the time to
fixation τc is exponential in N . Clearly as N gets large,
τc >> τs. In other words, it takes far longer for an ad-
versary population to evolve to manipulate the complex
control logic Lc than it does to evolve to manipulate the
simple logic Ls. Note, however, that if the adversary pop-
ulation were somehow to become large enough so as to en-
ter the deterministic regime, this result could in principle
reverse. For extremely large adversary populations with
low cost of ineffective tampering the complex logic can
be subverted more quickly than the simple logic, since in
the deterministic regime the expected time to fixation τ ′c
is of order log(1/N). The complex network in that case
admits an exponential speedup in terms of learning time
compared to the simple one.
III. WHAT MAKES A CONTROL NETWORK
LEARNABLE?
We have analyzed two example networks that differ in
their learnability. The next step is to develop a general
theory relating the properties of a control logic to the
learnability of that system.
A control logic can be described as a set F of
functions—one for each conditional in the branching
4logic. Each of these functions f in F takes some in-
put and returns either a 1 (if the formula specifying the
conditional evaluates to True) or 0 (otherwise, see Meth-
ods). In the example of section 2, the control logic would
take the signals S1 and S2 as inputs, and determine the
appropriate response by evaluating each conditional. We
can quantify circuit complexity as follows. The circuit
complexity of branch f of the control logic is simply the
minimum number of ternary logic gates (see Methods)
needed to implement f (13). The circuit complexity of
the full logic F is the maximum circuit complexity over
f in F .
We consider a control logic to be effectively unlearn-
able by natural selection if the learning time for this logic
is exponential in the number of signals n. In this case,
the controller can force the learning time to blow up ex-
ponentially by adding even a modest number of signals.
The major result of this section is that one can construct
an effectively unlearnable control logic with circuit com-
plexity that is linear in the number of signals. Formally,
Theorem 1 There exists a control logic on n signals
with circuit complexity O(n) is learnable in a number of
generations exponential in n.
We prove this theorem in the Appendix; the ba-
sic intuition is as follows. Think of the n-dimensional
3× 3× 3× ...× 3 hypercube where each dimension repre-
sents perturbations (down, none, up) to one signal. We
establish a control logic by which all corners of the hyper-
cube are global optima and the center is a local optimum.
All other spaces are fitness valleys. In other words, we
construct a control logic in which global maxima occur
only where each and every signal has been altered from
its default value. To reach a global optimum, an adver-
sary needs to tamper with n different signals. Then we
show that from the starting place where signals are left
unperturbed, the expected number of generations needed
to produce one of these beneficial n-mutants is exponen-
tial in n.
This construction is just one simple example. More
complicated fitness landscapes could lead pathogen pop-
ulations on detours through a sequence of local maxima,
delaying convergence to the global maximum.
IV. DISCUSSION
We were motivated by considering antagonistic coevo-
lution such as that between pathogens and the adaptive
immune system of vertebrates. Our framework suggests
that the kinds of signaling networks present in the im-
mune system induce a complex fitness landscape with
valleys and local maxima for pathogens attempting to
deceive the immune system. Our results are consistent
with two broad observations pertaining to immunology.
First, mice serve as a surprisingly faithful model system
for uncovering principles of immunological signaling and
control that are also valid in humans even though these
two species diverged 75 million years ago. This rela-
tive stasis is consistent with the predictions of the de-
fensive complexity model; a sufficiently complex immune
circuitry would limit the extent to which rapidly evolv-
ing viral and bacterial pathogens provoke coevolutionary
arms races than in turn would drive divergence between
the immune systems of mice and men. Second, immunol-
ogists have found it considerably difficult to decipher the
rules behind the functioning of the immune system. De-
fensive complexity might be expected to give involve to
complex rules which are difficult for pathogens to exploit
and immunologists to understand. The next step will be
to quantify the extent to which these observations arise
from defensive complexity rather than other factors.
V. METHODS
We implement the control logics for our example net-
works using Kleene’s three-valued logic; for truth tables
in Kleene’s logic, see ref. (14). We denote the perturba-
tions to signal i with ∆Si. Each perturbation can take on
values +, − or •. When instantiating the control logic,
we interpret + as 1, − as 0, and • as an input being
absent or unknown. For example, in the ¬ operation,
when given • as input, the output is also •. The AND
operator will evaluate to True only if both its inputs are
True. The OR operator will evaluate to True only if
at least one of its inputs is True. After the branching
program terminates—which happens when a particular
conditional evaluates to True—then the rest of the con-
ditionals cannot be triggered, and so the order of speci-
fication for the conditionals matters a great deal.
We use the notation ∧ for the AND logic gate, we use
∨ for the OR logic gate, ⊕ for XOR, and we use ¬ for
NOT. We can implement the control logic Ls as follows:
1. IF ∆S1 ∧ ¬∆S2, ∆RA = +2m
2. IF ∆S1 ⊕ ¬∆S2, ∆RA = +m
3. IF ∆S2 ∧ ¬∆S1, ∆RA = −2m
4. IF ∆S2 ⊕ ¬∆S1, ∆RA = −m
5. ELSE ∆RA = +0
We can implement control logic Lc as follows:
1. IF ∆S2 ∧ ¬∆S1, ∆RA = −2m
2. IF (∆S1∧∆S2)∨ (∆S1∧¬∆S2)∨ (¬∆S1∧¬∆S2),
∆RA = −m
3. IF (∆S1 ⊕ ¬∆S2) ∨ (S2 ⊕ ¬∆S1), ∆RA = +2m
4. ELSE ∆RA = +0
We have thus far discussed control logics in terms of
perturbations to signals, but this is only a way of simpli-
fying the full control logic for the purpose of discussion.
5In fact, we can construct control logics equivalent to the
perturbation-based control logics based on the following
substitutions. We say that • corresponds to the default
value di(c) that is set by the control logic to signal i based
on the value of the cue c (more explicitly, by the sensor,
based on the value of c), with + and − corresponding
to any quantity larger than di(c) and smaller than di(c)
respectively. Consider hi and li, which satisfy the in-
equality hi > di(c) > li for all i. We can translate each
gate over perturbations into a gate over the signals and
the original cue. For ¬∆Si we have
g¬(Si, c) =

li, if Si > di(c)
di(c), if Si = di(c)
hi, if Si < di(c)
For ∆S1 ∧ ∆S2 (with a ternary AND gate), we have
g∧(S1, S2, c) = (S1 > d1(c)) ∧ (S2 > d2(c)) where ∧
is the ordinary boolean AND gate. For ∆S1 ∨ ∆S2,
we have g∨(S1, S2, c) = S1 + S2 > d1(c) + d2(c). For
∆S1⊕∆S2, we have g⊕(S1, S2, c) = g∧(S1, g¬(S2, c), c)∨
g∧(g¬(S1, c), S2, c) where ∨ is the ordinary boolean OR
gate.
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Appendix A: Proof of main theorem
We envision the adversary population as evolving by
Wright-Fisher dynamics against a controller who deploys
a control system that generates a hypercube fitness land-
scape as sketched in section III. To analyze the learn-
ing process of the adversary population, we approximate
the Wright-Fisher dynamics using a branching process
model. The adversary population begins with a wild type
population of individuals that do not perturb the control
system at all. From this wild type, mutants arise that
perturb one of the control signals up or down; because
all single mutants are deleterious, these mutant individ-
uals step down into the fitness valley at some rate per
generation rate that is no larger than the product of the
population size and the mutation rate N µ.
To cross the valley in k dimensions, the individual
needs to found a lineage that accumulates at least k
successive mutations and thus this lineage must survive
in the fitness valley for at least k generations. Alterna-
tively, a lineage could pick up multiple mutations in each
generation—but this won’t help. Consider the case that
w mutants arise each time step, and the lineage must
survive for at least k/w generations. When k grows very
large and w is constant, asymptotic analysis tells us that
6the individual needs to found a lineage that survives for
at least Θ(k) generations (because limk→∞ |k/wk | = (1/w)
and limk→∞ | kk/w | = w). In this case, generating w-
mutants each time-step doesn’t speed up crossing the fit-
ness valley appreciably. But what w is allowed to grow
with k? For example, let w = ck, where 0 < c ≤ 1. In
that case we would only require a lineage to survive for
1/c steps, and this is independent of k. But the time that
it would take to generate the w mutant required for each
successive step is on average 1
µck
=
(
1
µ
)ck
where µ is the
mutation rate. There is no escape from an average time
exponential in k.
It is therefore sufficient to determine how likely an in-
dividual who steps down into the valley is to found a
lineage that survives in the valley for at least k genera-
tions, as k grows very large. If this probability decreases
exponentially with k, the average time until we get the
first individual who is destined to succeed will increase
exponentially in k. To model the fate of such a lineage,
we approximate it as a subcritical branching process (15–
17). If the relative fitness of an individual in the valley
is 0 < λ < 1, this individual will have a Poisson num-
ber of offspring with mean λ. Each of these offspring
will themselves have Poisson numbers of offspring, again
with mean λ. First we prove a technical lemma, and
then we show that indeed the average time until we get
the first individual who is destined to succeed increases
exponentially in k as k grows large.
Lemma 2 1 − e−λf [eλe−λ , k] = |e−λ − 1|λO(k), where
λ < 1 and f [b, k] is the tetration function bb
...b
with k
levels of iterated exponentiation.
Proof First we use the result (Theorem 2 in ref. (18))
that since λ < 1, f [eλe
−λ
, k] converges to eλ at a linear
rate λ. Thus for any n, we have |f [eλe−λ , n+ 1]− eλ| =
O(λ|f [eλe−λ , n]− eλ|).
From the above, terminating with k and solving the
recurrence relation, we obtain:
|f [eλe−λ , k]− eλ| = λO(k)|f [eλe−λ , 0]− eλ|,
and so by the definition of tetration, |f [eλe−λ , k]− eλ| =
λO(k)|1− eλ|. The symmetry property of absolute value
implies that |eλ − f [eλe−λ , k]| = λO(k)|1− eλ|
Multiply both sides by e−λ to obtain:
|1− e−λf [eλe−λ , k]| = λO(k)|e−λ − 1|
since for c > 0, c|a − b| = |c(a − b)|. Because
fk = e
−λf [eλe
−λ
, k] is the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of some distribution (19), this implies that
0 ≤ fk ≤ 1. Therefore, 0 ≤ 1− fk ≤ 1, and in particular,
1 − fk ≥ 0. Consequently we can simplify the absolute
value as follows:
1− e−λf [eλe−λ , k] = λO(k)|e−λ − 1|
And thus 1− e−λf [eλe−λ , k] = |e−λ − 1|λO(k)
Lemma 3 As k grows large, the average time until we
get the first individual who is destined to succeed assum-
ing its lineage is modeled by a subcritical Poisson branch-
ing process (with average number of offspring 0 < λ < 1)
is at least (1/λ)Ω(k−1)/(N µ) generations on average.
Proof By the subcriticality of the branching process that
generates the lineage, λ < 1. The random variable Y is
the number of generations the lineage generated by the
branching process survives. The CDF of the branching
process fn = P (Y ≤ n) gives us the probability of a
lineage surviving no more than n generations. Therefore,
for our purposes, we need to characterize the probability
of non-extinction for k generations, which means we must
characterize P (Y > k − 1) = 1− fk−1.
By equation 2.5 in Farrington and Grant (19), when
λ ≤ 1, fn = e−λf [eλe−λ , n], where f [b, k] is the tetra-
tion function. Therefore, by Lemma 2, P (Y > k − 1) =
|e−λ−1|λO(k−1). The number of mutants who must enter
the valley before one does so successfully is on average
1/P (Y > k− 1), which is thus at least (1/λ)Ω(k−1) since
it is easy to show that 0 < |e−λ − 1| < 1. Since the rate
at which mutants are produced from the wild type each
generation is upper bounded by N µ, the result follows.
Now to prove the main Theorem, we combine Lemma
3 with a suitable control logic:
Theorem 1 There exists a control logic on n signals
with circuit complexity O(n) is learnable in a number of
generations exponential in n.
Proof Without loss of generality we will assume that the
controller response with deleterious consequences to the
adversaries is R1. What this means is that the fitness of
the adversary is 1−∆R1.
The adversary has three possible actions, upregulate,
downregulate, or do nothing. We will now build a control
logic that downregulates R1 only if the adversary upreg-
ulates or downregulates each and every one of the signals
(rather than doing nothing), and otherwise upregulates
R1. We will then show that for small enough adversary
populations, generating an n-mutant takes time expo-
nential in n.
The control logic L we consider is simply:
1. IF D(∆x1) ∧ ... ∧D(∆xn), ∆R1 = +0
2. IF D(∆x1) ∨ ... ∨D(∆xn), ∆R1 = δ
3. ELSE ∆R1 = −s
where D(x) = (x⇔ •) and 0 < δ < 1. Here⇔ represents
the logical equivalence operator in Kleene’s logic. Gen-
erating an optimal type requires a beneficial n-mutant
with deleterious intermediates, and by Lemma 3, this
takes at least on average (1/λ)Ω(n−1)/(N µ) generations,
for 0 < λ < 1. Since λ is the relative fitness of an indi-
vidual in the fitness valley λ = 1− δ by line 1 of L.
7Now note that L on the first line has n clauses of the
form ∆x <=> •, each of which has 1 gate, and connected
by n−1 OR gates. In total then there are n+n−1 = 2n−1
gates on the first line of L (and this is maximal). The
result follows.
